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One of the most important forms of evidence in any criminal case
is testimony. Because of the importance of testimony, witnesses are
generally required to cooperate with prosecuting authorities by an-
swering all relevant questions. However, the Anglo-American system
of criminal justice, which is based on the investigative, rather than the
inquisitorial, method of prosecution, has firmly rejected the notion of
a witness being compelled to testify against himself.
On the other hand, crimes such as conspiracy and bribery can only
be prosecuted through the testimony of witnesses who necessarily relate
events which are incriminating to themselves as well as others. Recog-
nizing this problem, legislatures have enacted statutes which seek to
compel a witness to testify by substituting immunity from prosecution
for the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' That a
grant of immunity can be a satisfactory substitute for the right to re-
main silent is a well-accepted proposition but the scope of the im-
munity which must be accorded a witness has long been a subject of
intense debate. The case to be discussed in this comment, Kastigar v.
United States,2 is the Supreme Court's answer to that question.
* This article is a student work prepared by Richard McMahon, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 While the fifth amendment privilege applies to incriminating oral testimony, it is
generally recognized that it is not a violation of the amendment to require one
accused of a crime to submit to such scientific tests as blood analysis, urinalysis
or breath tests.
The Supreme Court has held that the withdrawal of blood from an accused
by a physician at a state officer's direction, without the consent of the accused,
does not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (state prosecution for driving an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor).
2 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court decided three similar cases on the same day:
Kastigar v. United States; Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation,
406 U.S. 472 (1972); and Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Comm'n, 406 U.S.
KASTIGAR V. UNITED STATES
Petitioners in Kastigar were summoned
to appear before the United States Grand
Jury for the Central District of California.
Expecting the prospective witnesses to
claim the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, the federal authorities
applied to the district court for an order
granting petitioners immunity pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03. When petitioners
appeared and, despite the grant of im-
munity, refused to testify, they were con-
victed of contempt of court. This convic-
tion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
Underlying the petitioners' continuing
refusal to answer the government's ques-
tions was their belief that the statutory
"use immunity' 4 granted them was insuf-
ficient to replace their constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The
482 (1972). The central issue in the latter two
cases was the same as that in Kastigar. In the
Zicarelli case, the petitioner also claimed that the
term "responsive" in the statute which limited
immunity to answers "responsive" to the questions
asked was too vague. The Court denied this claim
and also felt that the petitioner's assertion that
he would be subject to prosecution by a foreign
jurisdiction dealt with too remote a danger. In
Sarno, the petitioner claimed that Illinois had
failed to demonstrate that it was granting him
transactional immunity. The decision in Kasti-
gar made this contention moot.
a Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th
Cir. 1971).
4 18 U.S.C. § 6002 reads in pertinent part:
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the oath (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal
case . ..
Id. This statute has replaced the formerly numer-
ous and diverse federal immunity statutes.
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, de-
ciding 5-2, with two Justices abstaining,
that use immunity is coextensive with the
fifth amendment privilege.5
Although they have been the cause of
much complex argumentation over the
scope of fifth amendment protection, the
two basic forms of immunity, "transac-
tional" and "use," are not concepts in-
herently difficult to understand. The pres-
ent-day use immunity approved in Kastigar
(also known as "use plus fruits" immu-
nity) guarantees that the testimony given
by a witness may not be used, either di-
rectly or indirectly, against him in any
criminal proceeding. This means that not
only the testimony itself but also other evi-
dence gained through any use of the wit-
ness's testimony is inadmissible at trial.6
A witness granted use immunity may, how-
ever, be prosecuted for a crime about
which he testifies if evidence is obtained
independently of any use of his testimony.
Transactional immunity is broader in
scope, shielding the witness from prosecu-
tion for any crime about which he testifies,
regardless of how evidence is obtained.
Thus, a prosecutor may have a perfectly
sound case against a witness before he
testifies, or may at a later time indepen-
5 406 U.S. 462. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the
majority opinion. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist
took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case and Justices Douglas and Marshall filed
dissenting opinions. See notes 70-84 and accom-
panying text infra.
6 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964). This is the
modern version of use immunity. It does not
seem that use immunity was known to protect
against such indirect use of testimony in early
interpretations of the statutes. See, e.g., Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
dently develop a case against the witness.
In both these situations, the state would be
barred from prosecuting a witness who had
been granted transactional immunity,7 al-
though a witness testifying under a grant
of use immunity could have been prose-
cuted.
In order to obtain vital information that
would otherwise be unavailable, the fed-
eral and all state governments have en-
acted immunity statutes.8 The legislatures'
choice of either use or transactional im-
munity is a matter of constitutional signifi-
cance because of the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination, 9 a priv-
ilege the immunity statutes are designed
to sidestep. The power of the states and
the federal government to compel a wit-
ness's testimony by immunity legislation is
founded on the belief that the only pur-
pose of the fifth amendment is to protect
against criminal prosecution.' 0 Therefore,
the important issue becomes what type of
immunity is coextensive with the privilege.
The controversy which led to the de-
cision in Kastigar was precipitated to a
7 Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
"Federalized", 31 BKLYN L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1964)
[hereinafter Sobel]. The witness's answer must be
responsive in order to be covered by the im-
munity. Thus, a witness cannot obtain immunity
by blurting out that he committed "murder,
robbery and rape" in answer to a question which
is in no way directed towards the eliciting of such
disclosures. But the immunity is said to extend to
any "clue fact"; in other words, to any fact which
may furnish leads or links to a crime.
8 Comment, Federalism and the Fifth-Con-
figurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 561, 562 (1965) [hereinafter Federal-
ism].
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person
• . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ... "
10 Federalism, supra note 8, at 563.
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great extent by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion. 1 While recognizing that a witness
testifying under a state grant of transac-
tional immunity was protected from the
use of that testimony by federal authorities,
the Court held that he could be prosecuted
if the federal authorities had an indepen-
dent source for their evidence. 12
Some courts interpreted Murphy as ap-
plying only to the actual facts presented,
i.e., the duty of one jurisdiction to an in-
dividual who has been compelled to in-
criminate himself under another jurisdic-
tion's grant of transactional immunity. 13
But other courts and legislators interpreted
the case as a sub silentio overruling of the
transactional rule enunciated in Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock.'4 Thus, the decision in
the instant case can be traced directly to
the Murphy decision. In order to fully un-
derstand the reasoning and implications of
Kastigar, however, a brief discussion of the
extensive history of the privilege against
self-incrimination and immunity statutes
will prove helpful.
Historical Development
The privilege originally developed as a
limited reaction to the harsh practices en-
11 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
12 Id. at 79 n.18.
13 See, e.g., Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (8th
Cir. 1971).
14 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See, e.g., Zicarelli v.
New Jersey Crime Investigating Comm'n, 55 N.J.
249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970); Stewart v. United
States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted sub nom., Kastigar v. United States, 402
U.S. 971 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9M-17(b)
(1970); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970).
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gaged in by ecclesiastical courts and the
infamous English Court of Star Chamber.
These courts forced the witness, by var-
iegated means including torture, to answer
irrelevant and broad questions not based
upon a proper presentment or a reasonable
showing that the individual was guilty of
a specific charge.15 There was, of course,
strong opposition to the extreme methods
employed by the Star Chamber; but the
opposition also evidenced a dislike for the
practice of putting an individual to the op-
tion of convicting himself or committing
perjury. The modern version of the privi-
lege, which does not countenance any
method of forcing a person to testify
against himself, is in no way inconsistent
with the earlier development of the privi-
lege.1 6
The right to refuse to provide self-in-
criminating answers to questions was first
recognized because of the determination
of an individual named "Freeborn John"
Lilburne. In 1637, Lilburne was brought
before the Star Chamber court to answer
a charge that he had imported heretical
books. He refused to take an oath to an-
swer all questions truthfully because such
an oath meant that he could not refuse to
answer any question, no matter how broad
or incriminating. For his refusal, Lilburne
15 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 115, at 246-47 (2d
ed. 1972). Thus, the concept of allowing a
witness the privilege of refusing to answer ques-
tions relating to his alleged criminality, even
when properly charged, was described by Jeremy
Bentham as "overkill." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2250, at 292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961),
citing J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
456, 462 (Bowring ed. 1843).
16 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 115, at 247 (2d ed.
1972).
was sentenced to be whipped and pilloried.
After the sentence was executed, he con-
tinued in his refusal and filed a petition
with Parliament. In proclaiming the pun-
ishment illegal and subsequently awarding
him an indemnity of 3000 pounds, Parlia-
ment established his right to remain silent.
Since that date, the privilege against self-
incrimination has been part of the English
Common Law.1.7 The United States Con-
stitution and the constitutions of all but
two states also contain language recog-
nizing the privilege.18
Immunity statutes have raised serious
questions throughout our legal history as
to the scope and purposes of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Chief Justice
Marshall, while sitting as a circuit judge,
outlined the scope of the privilege long be-
fore the first immunity statute was passed:
• . . [A]ccording to their statement [the
Counsel for the United States] a witness
can never refuse to answer any question
unless that answer unconnected with other
testimony would be sufficient to convict
him of crime. This would be rendering the
rule almost perfectly worthless. Many links
frequently compose the chain of testimony
17 E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY
3, 4 (1955). Jewish law recognized the privilege
long before modern times and in a more absolute
manner, making it impossible for a man to testify
against himself, either voluntarily or otherwise.
This was probably not, however, the source of
our use of the privilege but it did provide "an
ancient lineage and a high moral authority" for
the principle. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 441 (1968).
18 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252, at 319 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961). The two states that do
not have such constitutional language are Iowa
and New Jersey but both have statutes to the
same effect. Id. The above source also contains
a summary of the wording of each state's provi-
sion.
which is necessary to convict any individual
of a crime. It appears to the court to be the
true sense of the rule that no witness is
compellable to furnish any one of them
against himself.19
The first immunity statute was passed in
January, 1857, to aid Congress in its in-
vestigation of a vote-selling scheme. A
New York Times Washington correspon-
dent claimed that he had been approached
by certain members of the House of Repre-
sentatives concerning the voting scheme
but, when questioned by a House commit-
tee, he refused to testify on fifth amend-
10 1 BuRR's TRIAL 244 (1808). See Tehan v.
Scott, 382 U.S. 406 (1965) which speaks of
the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as
.. . preserving the integrity of a judicial sys-
tem in which even the guilty are not to be
convicted unless the prosecution "shoulder the
entire load."
Id. at 415. See also Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) where the Court
outlined the values which the privilege serves to
protect:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusa-
tion, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-
individual-balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause
is shown for disturbing him and by requiring
the government in its contest with the in-
dividual to shoulder the entire load; our re-
spect for the inviolability of the human per-
sonality and of the right of each individual to a
private enclave where he may lead a private
life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a
protection to the innocent.
Id. at 55 (footnotes omitted).
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ment grounds. 20 In response, Congress
passed an immunity act which granted any-
one testifying before a Congressional com-
mittee immunity from prosecution for any
act about which he testified.21 This statute
led to what were known as "immunity
baths," with witnesses eager to divulge all
their criminal activities, whether related or
unrelated to the subject under investiga-
tion, in order to be free from prosecution. 22
As a result, Congress amended the statute
in 1862 to limit the immunity of the wit-
ness to exclusion of the testimony actually
given (limited use immunity, not use plus
fruits immunity), rather than complete
freedom from prosecution. 23 This immu-
nity statute was not put to use immediately,
therefore delaying determination of its con-
stitutional validity until 1892.
In 1868, Congress extended the Con-
gressional hearings immunity to court pro-
ceedings.2 4 Yet it was not until the passage
of the Interstate Commerce Act 25 in 1887
20 Comment, The Federal Witness hnmunity Act
in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitu-
tional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571 (1963)
[hereinafter Comment].
21 Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155-56.
22 Modern statutes avoid such immunity baths
by requiring that answers be responsive to the
question in order to fall under the grant of im-
munity. The Counselman case implicitly recog-
nized the responsiveness requirement by stating
that a statute must "afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to
which the question relates," 142 U.S. at 586 (em-
phasis added). In its 1862 amendment of the
immunity statute, Congress chose to limit the
immunity itself in order to solve the immunity
baths problem.
23 Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333.
24 Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37. See
Comment, note 19 supra, at 1572.
25 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. 49
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1954).
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that the immunity act was invoked and
subsequently put to the constitutional test.
A witness before a grand jury investigation
into alleged violations of the Interstate
Commerce Act refused to testify. He was
granted immunity under the 1868 Act, but
he continued his refusal and was held in
contempt of court. 26 The appeal of this
contempt citation led to the landmark de-
cision of Counselman v. Hitchcock27 which
found that the statute of 1868 did not
grant an immunity coextensive with the
privilege against self-incrimination and
could not, therefore, be used to compel a
witness's testimony.2 8 As mentioned above,
the immunity granted by this statute was of
the use type, guaranteeing only that the
testimony of the witness could not be used
as evidence in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding brought against him. The Court
stressed that such a grant of immunity
26 Comment, supra note 20, at 1573.
27 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
28 Id. at 585-86.
We are clearly of the opinion that no statute
which leaves the party or witness subject to
prosecution after he answers the incriminating
question put to him can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of the United States. Section 860
of the Revised Statutes does not supply a com-
plete protection from all the perils against
which the constitutional prohibition was de-
signed to guard and is not a full substitute for
that prohibition.
Id. The Court rejected the contention that the
courts of Virginia, New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts had held that the immunity statute must
be so broad as to give complete freedom from
prosecution because the constitutions of those
states gave to the witness a broader privilege than
that of the United States. The Court said that
the differences in the wording of the statutes
should not be considered crucial because they
were all protecting against the same evil. Id. at
584-86.
would not protect against use of the testi-
mony by the prosecution in the acquisition
of new evidence. 29 In other words, the
prosecution was free to use what it learned
about the witness's activities or associates
as a starting point for an investigation, pre-
senting only the newly discovered evidence
at the trial of the witness.
The Counselinan decision led to the en-
actment of the Immunity Act of 189330
which granted transactional immunity
rather than the more limited use immunity
given under the previous statute. Important
questions concerning the scope of the fifth
amendment privilege remained unresolved,
however. A federal district court held that
the Act of 1893 was invalid because it did
not grant protection from private re-
prisals.31 That ruling was overturned by the
29 Id. at 574.
30 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443,
which provided:
But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he may testify....
31 United States v. James, 60 F. 257 (D.C.N.D.
111. 1894). In holding that the Fifth Amendment
was meant to protect against private reprisals as
well as public, Judge Grosscup maintained that
the history of the Anglo-Saxon, as contrasted
with the Latin people, put a great importance on
the value of men as individuals and their right to
privacy, rather than simply the place and value of
a man as part of the state. Id. at 262. See atso
L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
(1968):
The clause by its terms also protected against
more than just "self-incrimination," a phrase
that had never been used in the long history
of its origins and development. The right
against self-incrimination is a short-hand gloss
of modern origin that implies a restriction not
in the constitutional clause. The right not to
be a witness against oneself imports a principle
of wider reach, applicable, at least in criminal
Supreme Court in Brown v. Walker,3 2
where it was held that the privilege ex-
tended only to freedom from criminal
prosecution. 33 The Court also held that the
statute granted immunity from state as well
as federal prosecution.3 4 Thus, it was de-
cases, to the self-production of any adverse
evidence including evidence that made one the
herald of his own infamy, thereby publicly
disgracing him.
Id. at 427.
32 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
33 Id. at 598. "[T]he fact that the testimony
may tend to degrade the witness in public es-
timation does not exempt him from the duty of
disclosure." Id. at 605.
See also Note, Immunity Statutes and the
Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 966
(1968):
By far the most difficult problem presented by
immunity statutes concerns the scope of the
consequences against which the witness must
be immunized to satisfy the Counselman re-
quirement that the immunity be coextensive
with the privilege. That scope cannot be un-
limited: the privilege does not and the im-
munity therefore need not protect against
social ostracism, degradation, or criticism. Im-
munity would clearly be impossible if it were
required that the Government protect the
witness against all private consequences of the
facts revealed by his testimony.
34 161 U.S. at 608; see also Wendel, Compul-
sory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amend-
inent Privilege: New Developments and New
Confusion, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 327, 345 (1966)
[hereinafter Wendel]. The author states:
Justice Brown disposed of the question of the
immunity law's adequacy in the light of possi-
ble state prosecution by ruling: (1) Since the
Fifth Amendment does not apply to the states,
it would not seem necessary to extend im-
munity to state proceedings; (2) but, as a
matter of fact, the Immunity Act of 1893 is
sufficiently broad to grant such immunity; and
(3) even if the immunity statute did not pro-
vide sufficiently broad immunity against the
state, the danger of state prosecution is so
remote that it would not disturb the validity of
the law.
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termined that a statute which granted im-
munity from prosecution (transactional
immunity) as a substitute for the privilege
met the requirement of coextensiveness
with the privilege which was laid down in
the Counselnan case.3 5
In 1903, Congress passed a new im-
munity act 36 which dealt with the com-
pulsion of testimony in all actions brought
under the Antitrust Acts. 37 This 1903 im-
munity statute, following the guideline of
the Brown decision, provided for complete
immunity from future prosecution, i.e.,
transactional immunity. Alluding to the de-
cision in Brown, the Supreme Court held
this statute constitutional in Hale v. Hen-
kel. s But the Court also emphasized the
practical considerations that justify immu-
nity acts as substitutes for the fifth amend-
ment privilege:
As the combinations or conspiracies pro-
vided against by the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act can ordinarily be proved only by the
testimony of parties thereof, in the person
of their agents or employees, the privilege
claimed would practically nullify the whole
act of Congress. Of what use would it be
for the legislature to declare those com-
binations unlawful if the judicial power
may close the door of access to every avail-
able source of information upon the sub-
ject?39
35 161 U.S. at 610.
36 Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 755, 32 Stat. 904.
37 Id.
38 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The grand jury had
subpoenaed the witness, an employee of a cor-
poration, as well as some of the books and
papers of the corporation. The Court rejected the
petitioner's claim that he could not be compelled
to testify and also rejected the argument that the
fourth amendment protected against the seizure
of the books and papers. Id. at 73.
39 Id. at 70.
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Although the 1903 transactional statute
was to serve as a model for legislation in
many jurisdictions, Congress refined two
statutes granting transactional immunity
through separate amendments in 1903 and
1914.40 The amendments eliminated cor-
porations from immunity grants and made
it impossible for a witness to volunteer
testimony in order to gain immunity. 41
The need to update all immunity statutes
was highlighted by the case of Adams v.
Maryland.42 In that case, the witness testi-
fied before a Senate committee investigat-
ing gambling and admitted his gambling
activity. He testified without once claiming
40 Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, 32 Stat. 825;
Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717.
These refinements were in answer to the loop-
holes found to exist in the immunity statutes after
the case of United States v. Armour & Co., 142
F. 808 (D.C.N.D. ill. 1906). Wendel, supra
note 34 at 347, n. 1. Most immunity statutes
have in common several factors which must be
complied with in order to supplant the witness's
fifth amendment privilege. (1) The witness must
be faced by the state with an attempt to exer-
cise its power to compel testimony. Thus, if the
witness were to wrongfully refuse to answer he
would be subject to legal punishment. (2) The
witness must refuse to answer based upon the
privilege. The state has no interest in granting
immunity to a witness who would voluntarily
divulge the sought-after testimony. (3) The
prosecution authorities must make the application
for the grant of immunity, weighing the value
of the witness's testimony against the right to
prosecute him. This factor is much less significant
under a use type immunity statute than under a
transactional type. (4) The grant of immunity
must be approved by the court. This formalizes
the procedure, puts the witness on notice that he
must now answer all questions, and operates as a
check on the prosecutor's power. MCCORMICK,
EvIDENCE 143, at 306-07 (2d ed. 1972).
41 Wendel at 349.
42 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
the fifth amendment privilege but was
nevertheless held to have been granted im-
munity under the statute of 1862.4 :1 Al-
though this statute fell under the Counsel-
man rule, it was still in force. The court
noted that it was the only statute ap-
plicable to Senate hearings in 1954,4 4 and
that it granted immunity automatically
even if a witness did not claim his fifth
amendment privilege. 45 The Court also
held that the ruling of unconstitutionality
in Counselman did not remove the statute's
ability to grant immunity, but meant only
that the immunity so conferred was in-
sufficient to replace the privilege.46 Since
the defendant in Adams was interested only
in preventing use of his testimony, the
1862 act was sufficient for his purposes.
Thus, the witness gained immunity from
use of his testimony although he had not
claimed fifth amendment privilege.
The Immunity Act of 195447 cleared up
the problem which the Adams case high-
lighted. The act was also applicable to
Congressional hearings48 but, unlike the
1862 statute, it required the witness to
claim the privilege in order to gain im-
43 Id. at 182. The petitioner here had been
prosecuted by the State of Maryland based on
the testimony which he gave before Congress. In
rejecting the contention that the federal statute
could not be held binding against the states, the
Court stated that "Article I of the Constitution
permits Congress to pass laws 'necessary and
proper' to carry into effect its power to get
testimony." Id. at 183.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 181.
46 Id. at 182.
47 Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat.
745.
48 Wendel at 349.
munity.49 Like other immunity statutes, it
was enacted for practical reasons. The in-
vestigative function of Congress was being
severely hampered by witnesses' refusing
to testify.50 In 1953 alone, 317 witnesses
invoked the privilege before Congressional
committees. 51
Ullmann v. United States5 2 was the first
major test of the Immunity Act of 1954.
The major point in the Ullmann peti-
tioner's attack was that the statute did not
protect against state prosecution. The
Court reaffirmed Brown and stated that the
Act prohibited states from prosecuting
Congressional witnesses.5 3
Malloy v. Hogan54 and Murphy v.
49 Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat.
745, which said that the witness would be
"... granted immunity ... after having claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination."
50 See Wendel at 349.
51 Id.
52 350 U.S. 422 (1956). The petitioner in this
case was summoned before a federal grand jury
investigating attempts to endanger the security
of the United States by espionage. He claimed
that even if the act were held to be constitu-
tional, the Court should exercise its discretion and
not accept the application of the U.S. Attorney
for immunity because it was not in the public
interest in this case. However, the Court held
that the act did not grant the judge any dis-
cretion. Id. at 432.
53 Id. at 431-32.
54 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In this case, the petitioner
had been compelled by the State of Connecticut
to testify before a referee concerning certain
gambling activities in which he had been in-
volved. The highest state court ruled that he was
not protected from prosecution because he had
not properly invoked the state privilege and the
federal privilege (fifth amendment) did not apply
to him. The United States Supreme Court held
that the fifth amendment did apply to the peti-
tioner and that the privilege is uniform through-
out the land. Id. at 3, 11.
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Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor,55 decided on the same day, are
two of the more important cases on the
scope of the fifth amendment privilege.
Malloy held that the amendment is binding
on the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and its re-
quirements are to be determined as a mat-
ter of federal constitutional law. 56 The
Murphy case decided that federal prosecu-
tors could not use testimony taken by com-
pulsion from a witness under a state grant
of immunity. 57 Thus, Murphy apparently
replaced with a less stringent standard the
rule of the Counselman and Brown de-
cisions that only complete freedom from
prosecution is sufficient to replace the
privilege:
Counselman and Murphy thus provide two
rules to govern substantially the same situa-
tion. Under Counselman, if the testimony
will incriminate, the privilege to remain
silent cannot be replaced unless the witness
is granted coextensive immunity from pros-
ecution. Under Murphy, a state witness
55 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
56 378 U.S. at 8. The Court noted:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal in-
fringement-the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the un-
fettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.
Id.
57 378 U.S. at 79 n.18. The Court implemented
its decision by stating:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has
testified under a state grant of immunity to
matters related to the federal prosecution, the
federal authorities have the burden of showing
that their evidence is not tainted by establishing
that they had an independent, legitimate
source for the disputed evidence.
Id.
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granted state immunity has no right to
remain silent even if the testimony will in-
criminate him under federal law because
use of the testimony or its fruits against
him in a federal (or state) prosecution is
constitutionally prohibited. Thus, while the
former holds that only immunity from
prosecution replaces the privilege, the latter
holds that immunity from use will suffice.5 8
If not for the decision in Malloy, the dif-
ference between Murphy and Counselman
could have been explained as the difference
between the fourteenth and fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination privileges. But the
Malloy case "rejects the view that the
privilege applicable against the federal gov-
ernment can be measured by a different
standard than that applicable against the
states."5 9
Justice Goldberg's majority opinion in
Murphy introduced the present-day con-
cept of use immunity since it emphasized
that the government may not make use
of the testimony of the witness or the fruits
of that testimony. This reference to stan-
dards for excluding evidence indicates that
Counselman may well have laid down its
broader standard because it was decided
before the exclusionary rules of evidence
were developed.60
After Murphy and before the decision
in Kastigar, there was much confusion
58 Federalism, supra note 8, at 577.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 584. The author feels that, at the time
of the Counselman decision, the heavier burden
placed upon the prosecution was balanced by the
necessity of protecting the witness. He states
that the Supreme Court's subsequent mandate of
exclusionary rules of evidence, in cases of coerced
confessions, for example, has eliminated the need
for this prosecution burden.
about the type and nature of immunity
which should or must be granted in ex-
change for the privilege. This was evi-
denced by two New York cases, People
v. LaBello6'1 and Gold v. Menna.6 02 In La-
Bello, the witness testified before the grand
jury concerning an assault and was granted
immunity under New York law. Two days
later, a policeman testified to the grand
jury that the witness had attempted to
bribe him to dispose of the evidence of
the assault. The witness was subsequently
indicted and convicted of attempted brib-
ery. The New York Court of Appeals af-
firmed the conviction, stating that the New
York statute prescribed use, rather than
transactional, immunity. That decision was
reversed, as to the type of statutory im-
munity, by the same court in the Gold
case with the notation that the reinterpreta-
tion did not mean that LaBello was incor-
rectly decided. The Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the attempted bribery in LaBello
was not part of the transaction that the
witness actually testified about.63
On its face, the dictum in Gold as to
what related matters are covered by trans-
actional immunity does not seem illogical
but, when compared with a prior state-
ment of the Supreme Court, it is a rather
strict construction of the term. In Heike
v. United States,64 a case involving im-
61 24 N.Y.2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 412, 301 N.Y.S.2d
544 (1969), cert. granted sub nom., Piccirillo v.
New York, 397 U.S. 933 (1970), cert. dismissed,
400 U.S. 548 (1971).
62 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1969).
63 Id. at 481, 255 N.E.2d at 238, 307 N.Y.S.2d
at 37.
64 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
munity under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 5 the Court construed the word "trans-
action" somewhat more liberally.
Although Heike held that the crime with
which the petitioner was charged was not
part of the "transaction" about which he
had previously testified, the explanation
was phrased in these terms:
The evidence did not concern any matter
of the present charge. Not only was the
general subject of the former investigation
wholly different, but the specific things
testified to had no connection with the facts
now in proof much closer than that they
were dealings of the same sugar company. 66
In LaBello, the subsequent prosecution
was related to a matter the witness had
been questioned about since the subject
area was the same and the connection of
the facts involved was proximate. There-
fore, the question of whether or not New
York was actually granting an immunity
coextensive with the privilege seemed to
be still ripe for decision but the Supreme
Court, after Gold, declined to hear the
LaBello appeal. 67
The Kastigar Case
Until this year, the Supreme Court had
ratified only one legislative attempt to
satisfy the fifth amendment requirement
by means of use immunity statutes. This
important exception existed in the case of
G5 Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 755, 32 Stat. 854, 15
U.S.C. § 32, as amended, Act of June 30, 1906,
34 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 33.
60 227 U.S. at 143.
07 Piccirillo v. New York, cert. dismissed, 400
U.S. 548 (1971).
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public employees where the sanction for
refusal to testify is dismissal from employ-
ment rather than a contempt citation. In
Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v.
Commissioner of Sanitation of New York,68
the court stated:
Granted that . . . the threat of dismissal
constitutes compulsion, such a public em-
ployee given use immunity is not being
required "to be a witness against himself."0 9
In all other cases, however, transactional
immunity had not been specifically over-
ruled as the standard 70 and the confusion
and controversy made the issue most ripe
for decision in Kastigar.
The immunity statute at issue in Kasti-
gar, a section of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, was admittedly "de-
signed to reflect the use-restriction im-
munity concept of Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission"7 1 as opposed to the transac-
tional standard which had previously been
considered necessary by the Supreme Court
in Counselman and Brown.
The primary reasons that Congress saw
fit to make the change to use immunity
were its less inhibiting effect on law en-
forcement and the suggestions found in
the Murphy decision-albeit mainly ob-
tained by reading between the lines-that
a use immunity statute which protected
68 426 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 917 (1971).
609 Id. at 626. See also Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967).
70 See, e.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
71 H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
4017-18 (1970).
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against use of the testimony as an investiga-
tory lead would be upheld by the Court.72
Of course, the Murphy case dealt with the
problem of two separate jurisdictions and
there were many who felt that the case
could be explained simply as a compromise
between the federal government's right to
decide who it wished to be able to prose-
cute and the witness's need for some real
safety. 73 Those who held this view be-
72 In his concurring opinion in Murphy, Justice
White clearly stated his opinion that use im-
munity is coextensive with the privilege:
The Constitution does not require that im-
munity go so far as to protect against all
prosecutions to which the testimony relates,
including prosecution of another government,
whether or not there is any causal connection
between the disclosure and the prosecution or
evidence offered at trial. In my view it is
possible for a federal prosecution to be based
on untainted evidence after a grant of federal
immunity in exchange for testimony in a
federal criminal investigation ...
378 U.S. 52, 106.
73 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias,
449 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1971):
Thus, to deprive a state of the right to prose-
cute a violation of its criminal law on the
basis of another state's grant of immunity
would be gravely in derogation of its sover-
eignty and obstructive of its administration of
justice.
Id. at 44; see also Piccirillo v. New York, 400
U.S. 548 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting at
563); In Re Kinoy Testimony, 326 F. Supp. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). This view was also expressed
by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 464 (1972).
74 The language used at the conclusion of the
Counselman opinion, supra, note 28 does provide
an apparently sound basis for such a position.
Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissenting in
Kastigar, firmly support this position, Justice
Douglas arguing that a grant of immunity is
adequate only "if it operates as a complete
pardon for the offense." 406 U.S. at 466.
75 See, e.g., In re Kinoy Testimony, 326 F.
Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); even the case of
lieved that the Counselman case, which
had never been challenged directly, stood
for the proposition that no less than com-
plete immunity from prosecution would
suffice to replace the privilege.7 4 Others
believed that the transactional language of
Counselman was taken out of context and
was not the basis of the holding in that
case.
75
Thus, in adopting the use immunity
statute as the constitutional standard, the
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), which
is cited to show the necessity of transactional
immunity, used words which add credence to
this view, saying that the privilege could be
satisfied by a statute that ". . . secur[ed] the
witness against a criminal prosecution, which
might be aided directly or indirectly by his dis-
closure . . ." Id. at 595; see also Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S.
70 (1965), which case was relied upon by the
petitioners in Kastigar to a large extent and is
illustrative of the ambiguity which started with
Counselinan and continued until the Kastigar
decision. The case arose over the failure of cer-
tain members of the Communist party to file
necessary registration forms. They claimed that
the requirement of filing the forms violated their
privilege against self-incrimination because they
could be prosecuted for their membership, which
the registration would provide evidence of, under
the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. The Court
held that the registration requirement did violate
the privilege and, quoting from the Counselman
transactional immunity language, stated, "Meas-
ured by these standards, the immunity granted by
§ 4(f) is not complete." Id. at 80. However, the
Court went on to explain the infirmity of the
immunity by noting that "it does not preclude
the use of the admission as an investigatory lead,
a use which is barred by the privilege." Id.
Interestingly, this opinion was written by Justice
Brennan who was later to indicate, in his dissent
to Piccirillo; that he considered only transactional
immunity sufficient to replace the privilege. The
wording of his opinion in Albertson certainly
gave no clue that the other Justices felt the same
way, however.
Kastigar Court relied upon the opinion
that the Counselman transactional lan-
guage was dictum 76 and adopted the view-
point that the Murphy rationalization of
use immunity in a dual jurisdictional set-
ting was equally applicable to a single
jurisdiction. 77
Indeed, the Counselman Court had ex-
plained the infirmity of the statute in ques-
tion by saying, "[i]t could not, and would
not prevent the use of his testimony to
search out other testimony to be used in
evidence against him or his property... -7
Thus, Kastigar merely construed the later
wording of the Counselman opinion calling
for a statute providing complete immunity
from future prosecution as the earlier
Court's suggestion as to what type of
statute would protect against such use.7 9
Having disposed of the Counselman de-
cision as a binding precedent, the next
question before the Court was whether or
not the statute's promise not to use the
testimony of the witness as an investigatory
lead could be kept as a practical matter.
The issue was resolved by comparing the
problem to that of coerced confessions. A
76 406 U.S. at 453.
77 Id. at 458. Mr. Justice Douglas strongly dis-
agreed with this contention. Murphy, he felt, was
merely an effort to solve a problem of federalism,
i.e., the ability of one jurisdiction, through a
grant of transactional immunity, to deprive an-
other of the right to prosecute a violation of its
laws. The Court, in deciding Murphy, never
intended to affect the Conselinan mandate of
transactional immunity within a single jurisdic-
tion, according to Justice Douglas. Id. at 463
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
78 142 U.S. at 564.
79 See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 437 (1956), which foreshadowed this inter-
pretation of Counselnan.
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defendant can suppress only the confession
itself, not the entire prosecution, it was
noted.8 0 However, the analogy is not per-
fect because the main purpose of the ex-
clusionary rules with respect to coerced
confessions is to deter authorities from
engaging in coercive practices by banning
their fruits.8' An immunity statute, on the
80 The Court related the compelled testimony
problem to coerced confessions and declared:
There can be no justification in reason or
policy for holding that the Constitution requires
an amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to
statute and accompanying safeguards, testi-
mony is compelled in exchange for immunity
from use and derivative use when no such
amnesty is required where the government,
acting without colorable right, coerces a de-
fendant into incriminating himself.
406 U.S. at 462. In fact, transactional immunity
is the only method of suppressing evidence that
completely bars further prosecution.
81 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 534 (1961). Justice
Marshall severely criticized the majority's analogy
to exclusionary rules applicable to coerced con-
fessions, stating that an immunity statute differs
from an exclusionary rule "in at least two critical
respects:" (a) the statute's approval of interroga-
tion, which approval obliges the Government "to
remove the danger of incrimination completely
and absolutely" and (b) the fact that the statute
acts in advance of the questioning, giving the
prosecution time to make a reasoned choice be-
tween compulsion of the testimony with con-
sequent loss of prosecution rights or retention of
prosecution rights without the right to compel
testimony. The latter factor prevents transactional
immunity from "imperiling large numbers of
otherwise valid convictions," Justice Marshall
noted. 406 U.S. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan has also argued against this
comparison:
Historically, one of the major evils sought to
be allayed by the development of the privilege
was the use of torture to extract a confession,
not the subsequent use of the confession in a
criminal trial. We continue to recognize this
distinction; for example, we permit the use
of voluntary confessions in criminal prose-
cutions. Thus, we object not so much to con-
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other hand, sanctions the coercion in ad-
vance, with the proviso that the compelled
testimony may be used only against others.
The Court also emphasized that the
burden of proof as to the independent
source of information, should a later prose-
cution occur, is on the government. Justice
Powell, speaking for the Kastigar ma-
jority, called this "very substantial pro-
tection, commensurate with that resulting
from invoking the privilege itself."'8 2 Thus,
a witness who has testified under a grant
of immunity and is later prosecuted con-
cerning an incident about which he testi-
fied, does not have to demonstrate that
the government used his testimony to aid
its prosecution. Rather, the government
must prove that it did not.
It is not the theory of use plus fruits
immunity that its critics quarrel with, how-
ever. Instead, they question whether, in
practice, it will be sufficient to bar use of
the fruits of coerced testimony. Suppose,
for example, that the prosecution's only
reason for starting an investigation was
the defendant's admissions in prior im-
munized testimony. The proponents of
transactional immunity argue that, in such
a case, it would indeed be difficult for the
defendant to rebut the government's claim
that it had made no use of his testimony.
The counter-argument is that a witness may
expose himself to investigation merely by
claiming the fifth amendment privilege, a
victing a man on the basis of evidence from his
own mouth, but rather to the practice of com-
pelling him to incriminate himself regardless of
a subsequent prosecution.
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 564 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
82 406 U.S. at 462.
risk which it could not reasonably be
argued that the courts should protect
against. But, on behalf of the use immunity
critics, it must be admitted that "when an
incriminating disclosure has actually been
made, a subsequent investigation is, real-
istically, likely to be more focused. '83
83 Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Be-
tween the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
and the Government's Need for Information,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103, 165. See also United
States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (8th
Cir. 1971):
In a criminal case, one of the most important
decisions a defendant must make is whether to
testify. If an individual, after being granted
use immunity, is subsequently prosecuted for
the same or a related transaction and elects to
testify at trial in his own behalf, he must, of
course, subject himself to cross-examination.
The prosecution is obviously in a position to
tailor his questions, consciously or otherwise,
on the basis of the defendant's prior testimony
and can do so without any overt reference to
the testimony given under immunity. In these
circumstances, could defense counsel effectively
object on the ground that the immunity grant
was thereby violated? I think not.
Id. at 45 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
It is this practical objection that Justice Mar-
shall highlighted in his dissent to Kastigar. He
felt that a "use plus fruits" immunity approach
meets the fifth amendment standard in theory
only. Justice Marshall asserted:
* . I cannot agree that a ban on use will in
practice be total, if it remains open for the
Government to convict the witness on the basis
of evidence derived from a legitimate indepen-
dent source.
• . . A witness who suspects that his com-
pelled testimony was used to develop a lead
will be hard pressed indeed to ferret out the
evidence necessary to prove it. And of course
it is no answer to say he need not prove it, for
though the Court puts the burden of proof on
the Government, the Government will have no
difficulty in meeting its burden by mere asser-
tion if the witness produces no contrary evi-
dence.
406 U.S. at 468-69.
Anxious to guard against erosion of the
privilege 4 the critics conclude that a use
immunity statute is too unreliable a sub-
stitute for the right to remain silent.
The Kastigar majority chose an alterna-
tive line of reasoning, however, relying
upon the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
White in Murphy. Justice White stated that
"[i]t is carrying a premise of perjury and
judicial incompetence to excess to believe
that this procedure [use immunity] poses
any hazard to the rights of an accused."8 5
Thus, how well the rights of the accused
are actually protected will depend upon
the diligence of the authorities in comply-
ing with the spirit of the law as well as its
letter. By placing the burden of proof on
the government, the Court has attempted
to give the words of the federal use im-
munity statute real meaning. Nevertheless,
one cautionary point mentioned earlier is
worthy of reiteration: the type of "fruit"
that results from immunized testimony of
a witness is not the same as the fruit of
an involuntary confession because the
former type of coercion is officially sanc-
84 The need to safeguard against erosion of the
privilege was best explained 76 years ago in these
words:
As already said, the very fact that the founders
of our institutions, by making the immunity an
express provision of our Constitution, disclosed
an intention to protect it from legislative at-
tack, creates a presumption against any act
professing to dispense with the Constitutional
privilege. It may not be said that, by no form
of enactment, can Congress supply an adequate
substitute, but doubtfulness of its entire suffi-
ciency, uncertainty of its meaning and effect,
will be fatal defects.
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 621 (1896)
(Shiras, J., dissenting).
85 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
103-04 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
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tioned. Therefore, the exclusionary rules,
which have permitted convictions under
the "attenuation" and "harmless error"
doctrines in cases involving illegally ob-
tained evidence, should not be applied to
the use of immunized testimony. s6 In im-
86 The basic purpose of "use plus fruits" immu-
nity is to prevent the prosecution from profiting,
either directly or indirectly, from the compelled
testimony of the witness. This does not mean that
the particular matters testified to will never be
the basis of a prosecution, for "[iff knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they
may be proved like any others but the knowledge
gained by the government's own wrong cannot be
used by it...." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). On the
other hand, under the exclusionary rules, the fact
that the government would not have obtained the
evidence were it not for the illegal activity does
not bar its use. Rather, it has been held that:
• . . the more apt question in such a case is
"whether, granting establishment of the pri-
mary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by ex-
ploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488,
(1962), quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT
221 (1959). Another example of this approach is
afforded by the case of Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939). In Nardone, the Court
dealt with a wiretap which had been conducted
illegally. The evidence obtained via the wiretap
had previously been excluded but the contention
on this appeal was that the government had used
the evidence as a stepping stone to obtain the
evidence actually used to convict. Although the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court because
it had not given this contention proper considera-
tion, the language that the Court used to explain
how a determination as to "fruits" should be
made sharpens the fears of those who anticipate
that a similar interpretation of "use plus fruits"
will be made in the immunity area:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal con-
nection between information obtained through
illicit wire-tapping and the Government proof.
As a matter of good sense, however, such
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plementing Kastigar, the courts should not
only place the burden of proof on the
prosecution but also resolve all doubts as
to use in favor of the witness-defendant.
connection may have become so attenuated as
to dissipate the taint.
308 U.S. at 341. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has formulated a rule whereby a court
may decide that the prosecution had a sound
case without the illegal evidence (harmless error)
and, therefore, its admissibility would be irrele-
vant. People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714 (1962). The case in-
volved a murder, and a confession obtained by
coercion had been held inadmissible. While con-
fessing, a defendant mentioned the name of a
man who had aided in burying the body of the
victim. Subsequently, the police located the body
by questioning the man named by the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that because "every
essential element of the crime was known to the
law enforcement officers before defendants were
arrested and Cisneros made the subject confes-
sion," and because it appeared that the police
would have procured the evidence in any event,
the finding of the body was not the fruit of the
involuntary confession and was, therefore, ad-
missible. Id. at 445.
CONCLUSION
The viability of use plus fruits immunity
as a substitute for the fifth amendment
privilege depends upon the integrity with
which it is enforced. Since the privilege
has for some time been deemed to protect
only against a witness's incriminating him-
self, the logic of an approach which per-
mits a prosecution to be based on inde-
pendently obtained evidence is sound. Laws
cannot be written in an overly protective
manner with distrust of authorities as their
foundation. Therefore, we should be willing
to grant the government as much power
as it can exercise without infringing upon
individual rights.
Because use plus fruits immunity does
give such power to governmental authori-
ties, it places a great deal of responsibility
on them. The burden of proof outlined by
Kastigar is only the secondary aspect of
this new responsibility; its primary re-
quirement is that of good faith.
